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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of mandating compensation disclosure on executive incentive contracts,
and the ensuing effects on earnings management, and shareholders’ and social welfare. We develop a
moral hazard model with multiple principal-agent pairs facing an external inspector who allocates re-
sources across firms to uncover and penalize earnings management. Contract disclosure confers prin-
cipals with a first-mover advantage, allowing them to design the contract anticipating the inspector’s
reaction. However, it may also exacerbate a coordination problem among principals, as they do not con-
sider externalities on other principals caused by the effects of their contract choices on the inspector’s
scrutiny allocation. We find that, if the penalty the inspector imposes on executives is relatively harsher
than that imposed on shareholders, contracts become more strongly contingent on reported earnings,
earnings are more severely manipulated, and social welfare increases with contract disclosure. However,
disclosure improves shareholders’ welfare only if the scrutiny resources available to the inspector are not
strongly constrained.
1 Introduction
The separation of ownership and control breeds a demand for mechanisms to align the interests of those con-
trolling the firm with those of the owners. Compensation contracts are one of the instruments firms make
use of to satisfy such demand. However, the frequent dispersion of ownership, the prevalent asymmetry
of information between management and shareholders, and the abundance of opportunities for manage-
ment opportunistic behavior, among other hurdles, make the alignment difficult and costly for shareholders.
Forming a compensation committee, as part of the board, is a usual remedy to overcome the high monitor-
ing costs of dispersed shareholders. However, often, some of the incentive alignment hurdles that apply to
managers apply also to compensation committees. To overcome such hurdles, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) mandates the disclosure of management compensation information with the intention
of facilitating the monitoring of external interested parties.12 However, little is known of how the disclosure
mandate affects the resulting contracts and the incentives of the signing parties (Jensen and Murphy 1990;
1See Yeaton (2007) and SEC Press release “SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure” (2015).
2In assessing materiality of misstatements, the incentive compensation is one of important factors according to SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 – Materiality.
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Mas 2016, 2017; Gipper 2017). Are the resulting disclosed contracts more strongly contingent on perfor-
mance? Do they reduce or increase opportunistic managerial misreporting? Is mandated contract disclosure
beneficial for shareholders? Does it increase welfare? In this paper, we intend to answer these questions
from an analytical perspective.
We examine a setting with multiple principal-agent pairs, each of which constitutes a firm. Every prin-
cipal in the economy offers a contract to the corresponding agent, who can accept or reject it. If the agent
rejects the contract he obtains his reservation utility, which we normalize to zero. All firms are potentially
subject to scrutiny by an external inspector, whose objective is to uncover and punish earnings management.
Based on all public information, the inspector scrutinizes reported earnings allocating its resources across
all firms in the economy. The inspector represents any third-party who is interested in analyzing corporate
financial reporting and detecting earnings management, such as a regulator (e.g., SEC), an auditor, financial
analysts, the media, or even investors. The scrutiny of a firm is costly for the inspector. More specifically,
the inspector incurs a direct cost, which increases with the level of inspection, and an indirect cost, which
reflects the inter-dependencies among the costs of scrutinizing different firms. Specifically, the scrutiny of
one firm can make the scrutiny of another firm more costly (i.e., the scrutiny decisions are substitutes) or
less costly (i.e., the scrutiny decisions are complements). The substitutability among the scrutiny of different
firms may indicate, for instance, that the inspector has limited resources, or that the inspector is forced to
use resources of decreasing efficiency as the aggregate volume of inspection increases. The complemen-
tarity among scrutiny decisions may reflect the inspector’s learning. For instance, inspecting one firm can
make the scrutiny of other similar firms more efficient. Alternatively, if the inspector learns about a new
way to manipulate earnings while inspecting one firm, this may facilitate the detection of the same kind of
manipulation in other firms. Finally, although we relax this assumption later on, we initially assume that the
inspector obtains an exogenous benefit from detecting earnings manipulation. In this setting, we compare
two regulatory scenarios: one in which contracts are required to be disclosed, which we denote “public
contract scenario”, and another one in which contracts are kept private, which we denote “private contract
scenario”.
In the public contract scenario, the inspector can use the disclosed information about contracts to form
conjectures about the level of earnings management in each firm in the economy. The observability of the
contracts allows each principal to enjoy a first-mover advantage against the inspector. That is, each principal
chooses the contract taking into consideration the inspector’s reaction. Moreover, the contract choice also
affects all other principals and agents in the economy through the inspector’s allocation of scrutiny resources.
Such externalities lead to a coordination problem among principals. The very incentive each principal has
to distort the contract to influence the inspector’s behavior ends up affecting all other principals and agents
in the economy. In contrast, in the private contract scenario, the inspector cannot rely on any contract
information to conjecture earnings management decisions. As a result, the principal cannot directly affect
the inspector’s choices and, thus, does not enjoy a first-mover advantage. However, the lack of influence on
the inspector’s scrutiny can potentially reduce inefficient contract distortions by alleviating the associated
externalities across firms.
The tradeoff between benefiting from a first-mover advantage and suffering a coordination problem
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determines which contracting scenario makes principals better off. In extreme cases, such as a one-firm
economy or an economy with a very large number of firms, externalities vanish or become immaterial.
Therefore, contract disclosure still awards a first-mover advantage to principals, but coordination problems
vanish or become inconsequential and, thus, principals are unambiguously better off in the public contract
scenario. However, when there are multiple firms in the economy but the number of firms is not too large,
the private contract scenario can be better for principals. If the scrutiny of one firm makes the scrutiny of
other firms more costly (i.e., substitutes) and such interdependencies are strong enough, then externalities
generated by contract disclosure may induce a coordination problem among principals to be severe enough
to overcome the benefit of the first-mover advantage. In such situation, principals are better off in the private
contract scenario.
We also examine the social welfare implications of contract disclosure. For this analysis, we assume
that the penalties imposed by the inspector to both, principal and agent, are simply wealth transfers that do
not affect welfare. That is, the social planner’s objective is to maximize the aggregate surplus of all firms net
of inspection costs. Nevertheless, we still assume that the inspector cannot commit to a level of scrutiny ex
ante. Instead, we assume that the aggregate punishment the inspector imposes on firms offsets the inspector’s
benefit from manipulation detection. In such a setting, the social planner chooses all contracts taking into
account externalities among principals and then, after firms report earnings, the inspector scrutinizes them
to detect earnings manipulation. The optimal pay-performance sensitivity is larger than those in both, the
public and the private, contract scenarios. As a result, mandating contract disclosure increases welfare if
only if the marginal cost of scrutiny for the principal is negative. Equivalently, mandating contract disclosure
increases welfare if only if the main effect of increasing scrutiny is to directly discipline the agent.
Our paper yields numerous empirical predictions. First, our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, mandat-
ing contract disclosure, or providing more information on compensation contracts, increases pay-performance
sensitivity, the amount of earnings management, and the total amount of compensation in scenarios in which
internal controls are relatively weak, or in regulatory scenarios in which the punishment for earnings manip-
ulation is relatively stronger for agents than for principals. Second, our analysis also yields predictions for
the cross-sectional variation of pay-performance sensitivity in both scenarios (i.e., before/after the adoption
of a regulation that enforces an increase in contract disclosure). In both scenarios, our analysis predicts that
pay-performance sensitivity increases (decreases) with the marginal punishment for the agent (the princi-
pal), and increases with the strength of internal controls. The effect of an increase in the cost of inspection
is non-monotonic in the public contract scenario. However, an increase in the cost of scrutiny monotoni-
cally increases pay-performance sensitivity in the private contract scenario. Finally, in the public contract
scenario, pay-performance sensitivity is expected to increase (decrease) with the number of peer firms if the
punishment for detected earnings manipulation to principals is large (small) relative to that for agents. In
the private contract scenario, on the other hand, the number of peer firms has no impact on pay-performance
sensitivity.
Our paper provides some related policy implications. We show that mandating contract disclosure can
produce unintended consequences. It can trigger a severe coordination problem among firms in setting their
compensation contracts. We show that such coordination problems can lead to a loss of social welfare.
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Consequently, the standard setter should take into account the externalities associated with the scrutiny
imposed on firms and the interactions of such scrutiny with contract choices at the firm level.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and highlights our contri-
bution. Section 3 presents our model. We first examine the public contract scenario and the private contract
scenario separately and then compare across the two regimes. Section 4 provides welfare analysis and
Section 5 offers empirical implications. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Literature
Our paper contributes to multiple streams of literature. First, it contributes to the literature on disclosure of
executive compensation contracts. Executive compensation has been extensively examined in prior literature
(Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Murphy, 1999, 2013; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Frydman and Jenter,
2010; Shue and Townsend, 2017). Because weaker governance structures have greater agency problems
leading to higher compensation to CEOs (Core, Holthausen, and Larker, 1999; Betrand and Mullainathan,
2001; Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Armstrong, Ittner, Larcker, 2012), pay transparency, as a disci-
plining and monitoring tool, has received attention recently and its effects have been closely examined. On
the one hand, some studies argue that disclosure may improve stewardship and accountability, and render
CEO pay more contigent on firm performance. For instance, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that the av-
erage salary plus bonus for top-quartile CEOs fell in 1974-86 compared to 1934-38 due to political forces,
fueled by the public disclosure of executive pay. Also, Mas (2017) shows that pay disclosure can lead to
public pressure to decrease the salaries of top managers in the public sector. On the other hand, other studies
argue that transparency may have unintended consequences and can even increase compensation (Hayes
and Schaefer, 2009; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012). For instance, Mas (2016) shows that, as a result of the
mandated pay disclosure of 1934, even though CEOs with the highest pay saw a decline in their compensa-
tion due to its visibility and salience, average CEO compensation increased and pay-performance sensitivity
declined (see also Card et al., 2013; Faulkender and Yang, 2013; Shue 2013; Gartenberg and Wulf, 2014).
Also, using the introduction of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in 2006 and its partial
rollback in 2012 with the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Gipper (2017) finds that mandating
disclosure of management contracts is associated with higher compensation.3 To a large extent, the above-
mentioned studies analyze the impact of pay disclosure on a firm’s optimal incentive design. However, the
disclosure of executive compensation can also inform other agents in the economy that can ultimately affect
the firm’s performance. For instance, a firm’s incentive system may be relevant to its competitors, its labor
force, investors, and regulatory institutions. However, the externalities of pay disclosure have received lit-
tle attention in the extant literature. Our paper intends to shed some light on one of such externalities. In
particular, we examine how contracts are affected by disclosure in the presence of an external inspector that
can detect earnings manipulation and punish firms and CEOs accordingly.
Our paper is also related to the literature on strategic delegation (Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Katz, 1991;
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Kedia, 2006; Bloomfield, 2018). Fershtman and Judd (1987) examine how
3See also Park, Nelson, and Huson (2001), Lo (2003), Craighead, Magnan, and Thorne (2004), and Schmidt (2012).
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competing owners provide incentives strategically in an oligopoly economy. They show that principals may
distort their agents’ incentives to induce beneficial changes in the decisions of competing agents.4 Also,
Katz (1991) studies how unobservable and observable contracts, can serve as precommitments to strategi-
cally influence the equilibrium outcome. Bloomfield (2018) empirically shows that, after the introduction
of CD&A, Cournot competitors are more likely to use revenue-based pay to commit to more aggressive
product market competitive decisions. All these papers examine the use delegation in product-market com-
petition. Instead, our paper examines the strategic interactions among firms that arise through the scrutiny of
a common third party, the inspector. In such a setting, mandating the disclosure of contracts, provides a first-
mover advantage to principals against the inspector but causes externalities that bring about a coordination
problem among firms.
Our study is also related to the broad literature on regulatory enforcement (Kydland and Prescott, 1977;
Dye, 2002; Liang, 2004; Chen, Mittendorf, and Zhang, 2010.; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2016; Laux and
Stocken, 2018). Dye (2010) analyzes how accounting standards influence reporting behavior and the evo-
lution of accounting standards. Ewert and Wagenhofer (2016) look into the relationship between public
enforcement and auditing, and find that enforcement and auditing can be complements or substitutes de-
pending on the enforcement intensity. Laux and Stocken (2018) study how accounting standards and reg-
ulatory enforcement affect entrepreneurial innovation and social welfare and examine implications on the
structure of regulatory penalties. Our paper differs from the extant literature in that it examines the coor-
dination problem among firms induced by the allocation of scrutiny resources of a common enforcer. In
addition, we specifically study the interaction of contract disclosure and enforcement.5
Lastly, our study is related to the literature on endogenous scrutiny as exerted, for instance, by auditors,
boards of directors, and financial analysts (Fellingham and Newman, 1985; Dye, Balachandran, and Magee,
1990; Dye, 1993, 1995; Schwartz, 1997; Hillegeist, 1999, Laux and Laux, 2009; Corona and Randhawa,
2010, 2018). Hillegeist (1999) investigates how three alternative damage apportionment rules affect the
strategic interaction among owners, auditors, and investors. Laux and Laux (2009) examine the design of
incentive contracts and monitoring policies by the board of directors, and their effects on financial reporting,
including the level of earnings management. Pae and Yoo (2001) analyze how a firm’s internal control and
its auditor’s effort jointly influence the informativeness of the auditor’s report. In contrast, we consider
a setting in which an inspector endogenously allocates resources to the simultaneous scrutiny of multiple
principal-agent pairs, and compare two regimes that differ only on the observability of the contracts that
such pairs sign.
4See also Brander and Spencer (1983, 1985), Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1986).
5Bozanic et al. (2017) examine how public and private disclosure reguirement affect tax regulator enforcement and firms’ public
disclosure.
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3 Model Setup
Players and Timeline
We consider a single-period contracting setting with three kinds of players: N identical principals (or share-
holder, referred to as “she”), N identical agents (or managers, referred to as “he”), and one inspector. All
agents are risk-averse and all other parties are risk-neutral. In any firm i ∈ {1, ...,N}, the principal needs
to hire an agent to operate it. All principals simultaneously, each one to a different agent, make a take-
it-or-leave-it contract offer. Each agent can either accept or reject the offer. If the agent rejects the offer,
the game ends.6 If the agent accepts the contract offer, he chooses a level of effort, ai, which is only ob-
served by the agent himself. Productive effort affects true earnings ei = vai + εi, where εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) is a
random component of earnings that the agent cannot control, and v > 0 is the true earnings sensitivity to
effort. The agent privately observes a true earnings and issues an earnings report ri = ei+mi, which he can
manipulate by adding a bias mi to the true earnings number. The contract, which can only be contingent on
reported earnings, ri, determines the agent’s compensation, wi(ri). After the principal remunerates the agent
according to the terms of the contract, based on all the public information F , the inspector simultaneously
scrutinizes all reports allocating resources optimally. The report of each firm i is scrutinized with intensity
si to detect earnings management. The inspector can represent any third-party interested in and capable of
detecting earnings management and directly or indirectly punish the principal and the agent accordingly. A
clear example is a regulator such as the SEC. However, auditors, financial analyst, the business press, and
even investors can also detect earnings management. Such external parties can reveal the detected manip-
ulation and damage the reputation of the firm and the agent, and also alert other parties with enforcement
powers. Both, the agent and the principal, are potentially subject to punishment for misreporting. Punish-
ments are proportional to the amount of earnings management, mi, times the level of scrutiny allocated to
that firm by the inspector, si. We often refer to the product of those two magnitudes (i.e., misi) as detected
manipulation.7
Since we want to examine the implications of contract disclosure, we examine and compare two sce-
narios: a regulatory scenario in which contracts are required to be disclosed and their fulfillment is verified
(henceforth, public contract scenario), and another regulatory scenario in which contracts are kept private
(henceforth, private contract scenario).8 The following timeline summarizes the sequence of events:
1. All principal-agent pairs sign contracts simultaneously
2. Each agent i exerts effort ai
3. Each agent i privately observes true earnings ei and issues a public earnings report ri
4. Principals and agents are remunerated according to the signed contract.
6Since all principal-agent pairs are identical, we abstract from any matching process. One can simply assume that principals
and agents are randomly paired. Alternatively, one can just assume that there are more agents than principals and that searching for
another agent is costless for the principal.
7In our main setting, we assume that the contract cannot be contingent on the manipulation detected by the inspector because
manipulation detection and punishment take place after the contract is executed. However, we examine an extension in which the
intensity of the internal scrutiny is part of the contract, and show that all our results do not change qualitatively.
8Under the private contract scenario, the principal can disclose the contract voluntarily. However, she can renegotiate privately
afterwards and thus our results remain unchanged.
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5. The inspector allocates resources {si} to scrutinize all firms, and manipulation is punished.
Principal’s Preferences
Each principal cares about her terminal terminal payoff Vi at date 5. The principal offers wi(ri) to the agent
to maximize the expected payoff:
Max
wi(ri)
EP[Vi] (1)
The terminal payoff Vi reflects the true earnings of the firm, ei, minus the penalty the principal pays for any
detected earnings manipulation, dPmisi, and minus the compensation wi(ri) paid to the agent, i.e., Vi = ei−
dPmisi−wi(ri), where dP > 0 is the intensity with which the principal is punished for earnings management.
For tractability, we restrict the contract to be linear, i.e., wi(ri) = αi +βiri, where αi is the fixed part of the
compensation and βi measures the sensitivity of the compensation to reported earnings, ri.
Agent’s Preferences
The agent is risk-averse with a CARA utility function, u(Wi) = −exp[−ρWi], where ρ is the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion, and Wi is the terminal wealth of agent i. Given the restriction to linear contracts, the
agent’s terminal wealth can be written as,
Wi = αi+βiri− c2a
2
i −
k
2
m2i −dAmisi. (2)
In the above expression, c reflects the convexity of the agent’s personal cost of effort. The last two terms
reflect two different costs that the agent incurs when manipulating earnings. The first term (i.e., k2 m
2
i ) reflects
the punishment imposed by the firm itself on the agent, which is increasing and convex in the amount of
earnings management the agent commits. The convexity of such a punishment, k, represents, in a reduced
form, the quality of the internal control of the firm, including considerations about the quality of the firm’s
information system and the intensity of the principal’s monitoring. The last term in the expression, reflects
the punishment imposed on the agent by the inspector (i.e., dAmisi). Here, the punishment is proportional to
the intensity of the punishment dA > 0 and to the detected manipulation misi.
Inspector’s Preferences
The inspector allocates resources across firms to uncover earnings management. Given the publicly available
information F , the inspector forms conjectures about each agent i’s manipulation mIi (F ), and chooses the
level with which to scrutinize each firm, s = (s1, s2, · · · , sN), to maximize its payoff:
Max
s
b
N
∑
i=1
mIi (F )si−
w
2
N
∑
i=1
s2i −
γ
2(N−1)
N
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
sis j, (3)
where, to ensure an interior solution, we assume that w2− γ2 > 0. Expression (3) 2reflects the assumption
that the inspector benefits from uncovering earnings manipulation, but also needs to spend costly resources
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to obtain such benefit. The first term in the inspector’s objective function indicates that she benefits from
the aggregate amount of manipulation detection at a rate b, the marginal benefit of manipulation detection.9
10The cost of scrutiny has two components. The first cost component captures the direct cost of scrutiny,
and its convexity is given by w. The second component reflects the interdependencies among the costs of
scrutinizing different firms. If γ > 0, allocating resources to scrutinize a firm is more costly if the inspector
is already spending resources scrutinizing other firms. Such substitutability among the inspector’s choices
may, for instance, reflect the fact that inspection resources are limited. If, on the other hand, γ < 0, the
scrutiny of one firm facilitates the scrutiny of other firms. This may capture the inspector’s learning. For
instance, the inspection of a firm in a certain industry may make the inspection of another firm in the same
industry more efficient. Alternatively, uncovering a certain kind manipulation in one firm may make it eas-
ier for the inspector to detect the same kind of manipulation in other firms. Finally, if γ = 0, the cost of
inspecting one firm is independent from the inspection of other firms. Notice that, the actions and choices
of the principal and the agent in a firm depend on those of other firms only through the inspector’s scrutiny
allocation. Indeed, γ is an important parameter in this analysis that shapes the interaction between firms
and affects the equilibrium contracts. The coefficient γ is divided by N− 1 to reflect the fact that, as the
number of firms increases, the size of each interaction among firms should be less important. As the num-
ber of firms increases, the regulator needs to spend more resources in scrutiny, making the significance of
each interaction between a pair of firms less critical. The number of direct cost terms in the inspectors
objective (i.e., w2 ∑
N
i=1 s
2
i ) increases in proportion to the number of firms, N, but the number of interactions
( γ2(N−1) ∑
N
i=1∑
N
j=1, j 6=i sis j) increases with N(N− 1). Thus, without dividing by N− 1, increasing the num-
ber of firms would eventually make the direct cost of inspecting a firm irrelevant, which does not seem
reasonable.
3.1 Public Contract Scenario
In this subsection, we analyze the public contract scenario. The timeline outlined above is still descriptive,
but with the qualification that all contracts are publicly disclosed once signed. Therefore, all players can
observe all contracts after date 1 and, as a result, the publicly available information F includes all earnings
reports and all contracts, i.e., F = {ri, αi, βi}Ni=1. Proceeding by backward induction, we first examine the
inspector’s scrutiny decisions. At date 5, the inspector forms conjectures about the manipulation decisions
of all agents, i.e., {mIi}Ni=1 and decides the level of scrutiny for each firm with the goal of maximizing her
payoff:
Max
s
b
N
∑
i=1
mIi si−
w
2
N
∑
i=1
s2i −
γ
2(N−1)
N
∑
i=1
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
sis j, (4)
9Since the inspector represents any external interested parties such as a regulator, an auditor, financial analysts, the media or
investors, their benefit of detecting earnings manipulation might be different and, therefore, we assume a general form of benefit.
For instance, by detecting earnings manipulation the inspector can gain reputation or promotion.
10The inspector’s objective function can be seen as the result of delegation. A benevolent social planner without commitment
would not try to detect earnings management because it is costly to do so, and since at that point agents have already made their
deicions, inspection would only decrease welfare. Therefore, creating a supervising institution and delegating the task of detecting
earnings management becomes the only way the social planner can commit to a scrutiny. If instread we allow for commitment, then
there is no difference between the private and public scenarios because the inspector’s behavior is not affected by the contracts ex
post.
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where, s = (s1, s2, · · · , sN). From (4), we obtain the following set of N first order conditions:
bmIi −wsi−
γ
(N−1)
N
∑
j=1, j 6=i
s j = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ...,N} (5)
Solving the system of Nequations we obtain a unique solution for the inspector’s scrutiny decisions:
si = b
(N−1)mIi − γw+γ ∑Nj=1 mIj
(N−1)w− γ ∀i ∈ {1, ...,N}. (6)
Note that in expression (6) the scrutiny of given firm i, si, increases with the inspector’s conjecture of the
amount of manipulation in that same firm, mIi . Indeed, the marginal benefit of scrutinizing firm i increases
with the amount of earnings management in that same firm. However, depending on the sign of γ , si may
increase or decrease with the inspector’s conjectured manipulation in other firms, mIj with j 6= i. The cost the
inspector incurs in scrutinizing firm i depends on how much the inspector scrutinizes other firms. If γ > 0,
a larger conjectured manipulation in other firms induces the inspector to scrutinize them more intensely.
That in turn makes the scrutiny in firm i more costly and, thus, induces the inspector to reduce si. Thus, si
decreases in the conjectured manipulation in other firms. However, if γ < 0, increasing the scrutiny of other
firms reduces the cost of scrutinizing firm i. As a result, si increases in the conjectured manipulation in other
firms.
At date 3, the agent observes the realization of true earnings in his firm and issues a report with the goal of
maximizing his utility. At this point in time, earnings are realized and, thus, the agent faces no uncertainty.
Given that the agent’s utility is monotonically increasing in his terminal wealth, the maximization of his
utility is equivalent to the maximization of his terminal wealth Wi, as defined in (2). That is, we can consider
that every agent i solves the program:
Max
mi
Wi (7)
The first order condition of the program above yields the optimal manipulation choice for the agent as a
function of the anticipated inspector’s scrutiny decision:
mi =
βi−dAsi
k
(8)
Intuitively, the amount of manipulation increases in the slope of the contract and decreases with the antici-
pated level of scrutiny.
At date 2, agent i makes the productive effort decision anticipating his earnings manipulation decision at
date 3 and the inspector’s scrutiny decision at date 4. The agent faces now the uncertainty of the realization
of earnings, but the CARA utility assumption jointly with the normality of εi allows us to express the
agent’s expected utility maximization program as an equivalent program in which the agent maximizes the
certainty equivalent, CEi. Indeed, we can write, E[u(Wi)] = u[CEi], where the certainty equivalent is given
by CEi = E[Wi]− ρ2Var[Wi], more specifically, CEi = αi + βi(vai +mi)− c2 a2i − k2 m2i − dAmisi− ρ2β 2i σ2ε .
Therefore, we can consider that the agent solves:
Max
ai
CEi (9)
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The optimal level of effort is obtained from the first-order conditions of the above program:
ai =
vβi
c
(10)
Since the contract is public, at the time when the agent makes his productive effort decision, neither the agent
nor the inspector have any private information. Therefore, the continuation game at this point constitutes a
proper subgame that is played by all agents and the inspector. Thus, from equations (8) and (6) we can solve
for the subgame-equilibrium earnings manipulation and scrutiny decisions,
mi =
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)((N−1)w− γ)βi+bdAγ∑Nj=1β j
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w− γ)+(N−1)bdA) (11)
si = b
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(N−1)βi− kγ∑Nj=1β j
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w− γ)+(N−1)bdA) (12)
Earnings manipulation and scrutiny decisions are interrelated. Expression (6) reveals that the intensity
with which firm i is inspected is contingent on the inspector’s conjectured amounts of manipulation in all
firms in the economy, and expression (8) indicates that any agent i manipulates earnings anticipating the
intensity with which firm i will be scrutinized. In the subgame equilibrium, the expressions for the agent’s
productive effort (10) and manipulation (11), and the inspector’s scrutiny (12) are all contingent on the
publicly observable contract slopes, β . In fact, all agents and the inspector play a simultaneous-choice game
which principals can affect with the contracts they offer. Indeed, although principal i can fully determine
agent i’s productive effort with the contract slope, βi, the amount of earnings management and scrutiny in
firm i are also contingent on the contract slopes chosen by all other principals in the economy. The following
Lemma states such contingency formally:
Lemma 1. In the public contract scenario, the productive effort, ai, the amount of earnings management,
mi, and the scrutiny of firm i, si, increase with the contract slope in the firm,βi. Also, mi increases (decreases)
and si decreases (increases) with the contract slopes in other firms, β j with j 6= i, if γ > (<)0. Formally,
dai
dβi
> 0,
dmi
dβi
> 0,
dsi
dβi
> 0, (13)
Sign
[
dmi
dβ j
]
= Sign [γ] , Sign
[
dsi
dβ j
]
=−Sign [γ] with j 6= i. (14)
The scrutiny of firm i, si, is increasing in the slope of its contract, βi. Certainly, observing a steeper con-
tract slope, the inspector conjectures that a larger amount of earnings management is committed, and thus
increases the scrutiny. Also, if scrutiny decisions are substitutes (i.e., γ > 0), then si decreases with in-
creases in the contract slopes of other firms. Noticing a steeper contract slope in other firms, the inspector
conjectures they committed more manipulation. Thus, the inspector increases the scrutiny of other firms, in
turn increasing the cost of scrutinizing firm i, and thereby inducing the inspector to lower the intensity of
inspection in firm i. If instead the scrutiny decisions are complements (i.e., γ < 0), then si intensifies with
increases in the contract slopes in other firms. Those steeper slopes suggest larger manipulation in those
10
firms, to which the inspector reacts with a more intense scrutiny. However, now that actually cheapens the
scrutiny of firm i, inducing the inspector to intensify it.
The effect of an increase in the contract slope on manipulation can be best characterized by decomposing it
as follows:
dmi
dβi
=
∂mi
∂βi
+
∂mi
∂ si
dsi
dβi
, (15)
Using expression (8) we can see that the first term is always positive, ∂mi∂βi =
1
k > 0, and reflects the straight-
forward intuition that a steeper contract slope increases the marginal benefit of manipulation for the agent,
which induces the agent to manipulate more. The second term, however, indicates that the observability of
the contracts attenuates this effect. An increase in βi increases the inspector’s scrutiny (i.e., dsidβi > 0), thereby
decreasing the agent’s incentives to manipulate ( ∂mi∂ si =−
dA
k < 0). In addition, earnings manipulation is also
affected by the contract slopes of other firms. If scrutiny decisions are substitutes, the inspector pays more
attention to other firms as they increase their contract slopes, and that reduces the attention the inspector
pays to firm i, facilitating earnings manipulation. If instead scrutiny decisions are complements, an increase
in the slopes of other firms facilitates the inspection of firm i, attenuating earnings manipulation.
At date 1, all principals simultaneously choose the contracts for their firms. Specifically, each principal
i chooses the optimal compensation contract {αi, βi} to maximize her expected payoff, subject to three
incentive compatibility constraints, (10), (11), and (12), and a participation constraint for the agent, CEi ≥ 0.
Since the principal enjoys all the bargaining power, the agent’s participation constraint binds. Therefore, the
fixed salary, αi, is determined by the participation constraint, and can be replaced in the principal’s objective
function, obtaining EP[Vi] = vai−dPmisi− c2 a2i − k2 m2i −dAmisi− ρ2β 2i σ2ε . Thus, the principal of firm i solves
the program:
Max
βi
EP[Vi] (16)
s.t.(10),(11), and (12) (17)
Using the constraints we can express the program in the following way:
Max
βi
vai(βi)−C (βi,si(βi)). (18)
In the above program, C (βi,si(βi)) = c2 ai(βi)
2 + k2 mi(βi,si)
2 +(dP + dA)mi(βi,si)si(βi)+ ρ2β
2
i σ2ε , denotes
the sum of all the costs incurred by the principal. This notation allows us to express our results in a much
more succinct and intuitive manner. Obtaining the first order condition for each firm i results in a system of
N equations of the form:
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
+
∂Ci
∂ si
dsi
dβi
f or all i ∈ {1, ...,N}. (19)
Each equation above requires the equilibrium contract slope in each firm i, βi, to balance the marginal
benefit with the marginal costs. The marginal cost has two components. The first component (i.e., ∂Ci∂βi )
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is attributable to the direct effects that a change in the contract slope has on the agent’s productive effort
and manipulation decisions keeping the inspector’s scrutiny constant. The second component (i.e., ∂Ci∂ si
dsi
dβi )
reflects the marginal cost of changing the inspector’s scrutiny by changing the contract slope. More specif-
ically, this term results from the multiplication of ∂Ci∂ si , the marginal cost of scrutiny, and
dsi
dβi , the change
in scrutiny induced by an increase in the contract slope. Solving the system of equations in (19) yields
closed form solutions for the the equilibrium contracts {αi, βi} ∀i ∈ {1, ...,N}, and for all the equilibrium
agent actions. The symmetry of the equilibrium allows us to write the marginal costs as ∂Ci∂βi =
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
βPub
and ∂Ci∂ si =
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
βPub, where
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
and
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
are constants and βPub is the equilibrium contract slope,
symmetric across contracts in the public contract scenario. Proposition 1 describes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium with Public Contracts) There exist a unique equilibrium in which contracts
and actions are symmetric across firms. Specifically, αi = αPub and βi = βPub for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, where
αPub =
c
2
a2Pub+
k
2
m2Pub+dAmPubsPub− (vaPub+mPub)βPub+
ρ
2
β 2Pubσ
2
ε , (20)
βPub =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
dsi
dβi
. (21)
Also, equilibrium effort, earnings management, and scrutiny levels are respectively given by ai = aPub,
mi = mPub, and si = sPub for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, where:
aPub = a0βPub, where a0 =
v
c
(22)
mPub = m0βPub, where m0 =
(w+ γ)
k(w+ γ)+bdA
(23)
sPub = s0βPub, where s0 =
b
k(w+ γ)+bdA
(24)
and
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
= ca0 ∂ai∂βi + km0
∂mi
∂βi +(dA + dP)s0
∂mi
∂βi +ρσ
2
ε ,
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= km0 ∂mi∂ si +(dA + dP)(s0
∂mi
∂ si +m0),
dsi
dβi =
b(N−1)−s0kγ
k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA ,
dai
dβi =
v
c ,
∂mi
∂βi =
1
k ,
∂mi
∂ si =−
dA
k .
The expression for the equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity in the public contract scenario, βPub, is
quite intuitive. The numerator reflects the sensitivity of the principal’s benefit of productive effort to the pay-
performance sensitivity, whereas the denominator aggregates the different marginal costs that the principal
incurs per unit of the pay-performance sensitivity. The first term in the denominator,[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
= ca0
∂ai
∂βi
+ km0
∂mi
∂βi
+(dA+dP)
∂mi
∂βi
s0+ρσ2ε , (25)
aggregates marginal costs directly attributable to an increase in the contract slope keeping the inspector’s
scrutiny constant. These include the marginal cost of productive effort, ca0 ∂ai∂βi , the agent’s marginal costs of
manipulation enforced by internal controls, km0 ∂mi∂βi > 0, the agent’s punishment by the inspector, dAs0
∂mi
∂βi >
0, the principal’s punishment by the inspector, dPs0 ∂mi∂βi > 0, and the risk premium ρσ
2
ε > 0. The second
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term in the denominator, [∂C i/∂ si]o dsidβi , aggregates the marginal costs generated indirectly by the inspector’s
scrutiny response to an increase in the contract slope. From Lemma 1, we know that an increase in the
contract slope induces the inspector to increase the scrutiny of the firm, dsidβi > 0, but a scrutiny increase can
affect the principal’s costs positively or negatively depending on the parameter values. Indeed, the term,[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= km0
∂mi
∂ si
+(dA+dP)(
∂mi
∂ si
s0+m0), (26)
is a key element in the comparison between scenarios, and its sign is the result of the balance between
two countervailing effects. On the one hand, scrutiny decreases the manipulation committed by the agent,
∂mi
∂ si = −
dA
k < 0, and that unambiguously decreases the costs of manipulation attributable to both internal
controls, km0 ∂mi∂ si , and external controls, (dA +dP)s0
∂mi
∂ si . On the other hand, for a fixed manipulation level,
scrutiny increases the external punishment directly by increasing the proportion of manipulation detected by
the inspector. Such a marginal effect is represented by the term, (dA+dP)m0. Therefore, increasing scrutiny
can potentially affect the principal’s objective positively or negatively. The following lemma provides some
insight about the sign of this constant:
Lemma 2.
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0⇐⇒ dA < ψ(dP)⇐⇒ k > k¯ ≡ bdA(dA+dP)dP(w+γ) ,
where ψ(dP) is monotonically increasing in dP.
An increase in scrutiny increases a principal’s cost if the punishment level for the agent, dA, is relatively
small compared to that for the principal, dP. Increasing dA reinforces the inhibiting effect of scrutiny on
manipulation, and that in turn reduces the cost of internal enforcement and the costs of external enforcement
for both principal and agent. However, a higher dP does not directly change the effect of scrutiny on manip-
ulation. Given a fixed contract, punishing the principal more only increases the direct cost of manipulation
for the principal. Therefore, if dA is relatively large compared to dP, the inspector’s scrutiny reduces the cost
of manipulation for the principal. However, if dP is relatively large compared to dA, the opposite is true. The
third inequality in Lemma 1 reveals that these countervailing effects do not matter if the internal enforcement
cost level, k, is large enough. In such a case, increasing scrutiny is always costly for the principal.
Proposition 1 also states that the equilibrium levels of effort aPub, earnings management mPub, and
inspection sPub increase with the equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity βPub. This functional form will
prove relevant in the comparison of the levels in the equilibrium decisions across scenarios.
Since in the public contract scenario both outcomes and contracts are public knowledge, at this point one
may wonder whether considering some sort of relative performance measurement could improve contractual
efficiency. The answer is that, given our assumptions, principals have no incentive to make the contract
contingent on the outcome or the contract slope of other firms. First, since the uncertain component of
earnings is independent across firms, there is no informational benefit in including the outcomes of other
firms in the contract. Second, since all principals choose contracts simultaneously, they cannot observe each
other’s contracts at the time they make their choices. Even though a firm’s contract can still be contingent on
the equilibrium slopes of other firms, at the time the contract is determined, principals can only conjecture
such contracts. Thus, principals cannot directly affect each other’s contract choices. Finally, although
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each principal’s choice of contract affects the payoffs of other principals through the inspector’s scrutiny
allocation, he does not have an incentive to take into account such externalities.
Given the prominence that βPub plays in the equilibrium decisions, it is informative to examine how it is
affected by changes in model parameters. Corollary 1 states the results of our comparative statics analysis.
Corollary 1. The equilibrium contract slope in the public contract scenario, βPub, changes with the param-
eters in the model as follows:
1. ∂βPub∂dA > 0;
∂βPub
∂dP < 0;
∂βPub
∂k > 0;
2. Changes with w:
(a) ∂βPub∂w > 0 if dA→ 0;
(b) ∂βPub∂w < 0 if dP→ 0;
3. Changes with γ:
(a) If dA→ 0, then ∂βPub∂γ > 0 for γ < w2+√3 , and
∂βPub
∂γ < 0 for γ >
w(N−1)
2+
√
3
;
(b) If dP→ 0, then ∂βPub∂γ < 0 for γ < kw+bdA3k , and ∂βPub∂γ > 0 for γ > (N−1) kw+bdA2k ;
(c) If γ → 0 then ∂βPub∂γ > (<)0 iff
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> (<)0;
4. ∂βPub∂N > (<)0 if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> (<)0 and γ 6= 0.
The first point in Corollary 1 states that the pay-performance sensitivity, βPub, is affected by the level of the
three different manipulation costs faced by the principal. An increase in k increases the marginal cost or
manipulation for the agent, reducing his incentives to manipulate for any given contract slope. Anticipating
this, the principal is able to increase βPub inducing less manipulation. An increase in dA, however, increases
βPub through three channels. The first effect is analogous to the one generated by an increase in k. In short,
an increase in dA directly increases the marginal cost of manipulation for the agent, curbing manipulation,
and thereby allowing the principal to increase incentives. Such a lower manipulation level generates two
additional effects. On the one hand, given a level of scrutiny, the cost of such scrutiny is lower because there
is less of a reason to punish principal and agent for. On the other hand, conjecturing a lower manipulation
level, the inspector reduces the scrutiny of the firm, thereby reducing the punishment for both, principal and
agent. These three effects allow the principal to increase βPub. In contrast, an increase in dP does not directly
effect the agent’s incentives to manipulate nor does it affect the inspector’s incentives to scrutinize the firm.
It simply increases the marginal punishment for the principal at given level of manipulation. As a result, the
principal decreases βPub to reduce the agent’s incentives to manipulate.
The second point in Corollary 1 examines how βPub changes with the extent to which scrutiny is costly
for the inspector, w. An increase in w affects βPub in two main ways. It reduces scrutiny, reducing the
detection of manipulation and its associated cost for the principal, allowing the principal to increase βPub.
However, the lower scrutiny also increases the agent’s incentives to manipulate, inducing the principal to
decrease the contract slope to avoid higher manipulation costs. If dA is small relative to dP the direct
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punishment to the principal takes center stage making the former effect dominant, but if dP is small relative
to dA then the agent’s manipulation cost is central and the latter effects dominates.
The third point in Corollary 1 examines the effects of changes in γ on βPub. An increase in γ produces
three main effects on the equilibrium contract slope. The first two effects are analogous to the effects of
w. The third effect pertains to the inspector’s allocation of scrutiny resources. Essentially, one can see an
increase in γ as tightening the inspector’s resources. As such, increasing γ makes the inspector’s scrutiny
more sensitive to an increase in the contract slope. This last effect is muted if γ is small, and that reduces the
effects of a change in γ to those of a change in w. However, if γ is large enough, the last effect dominates. An
increase in γ then intensifies the inspector’s scrutiny reaction to an increase in the contract slope. The effect
of such increased scrutiny, however, depends on which punishment is more salient. If dP is large relative
to dA, then scrutiny directly increases the principal’s punishment, who reacts by decreasing the slope of the
contract. However, if dA is large relative to dP, then an increase in scrutiny reduces the agent’s incentive to
manipulate, and that allows the principal to increase the contract slope.
Lastly, as N increases, principals see their individual influence on the inspector decrease. This can be
clearly seen mathematically because, in the expression for βPub, the only term affected by a change in the
number of firm is dsidβi . Intuitively, as the number of firms increases, the inspector’s attention is spread among
more firms, and each firm’s actions have a smaller impact on the inspector’s resource allocation decisions.
If scrutiny increases the cost for the principal (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o > 0), then an increase in the number of firms
decreases the cost of increasing the contract slope for the principal, who can then increase it. However, if
scrutiny decreases the cost for the principal (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o < 0), then an increase in the number of firms
produces the opposite effect, inducing the principal to decrease the contract slope.
3.2 Private Contract
In the private contract scenario, the inspector, as well as other principal-agent pairs, cannot observe the
contracts signed by any of the principal-agent pairs. That is, the publicly available information,F , includes
only earnings reports, i.e., F = {ri}Ni=1. The derivation of the equilibrium in this scenario is analogous
to the one in the public contract scenario but with one important difference: the inspector cannot rely on
the contract to conjecture the agent’s actions. When deciding the allocation of resources to the scrutiny of
different firms, the inspector knows neither the actions of the principals nor the actions of the agents. The
inspector can only conjecture them. In essence, with private contracts, there is no proper subgame. Thus,
every principal i ∈ {1, ...,N} solves the following program,
Max
βi
vai−dPmisi− c2a
2
i −
k
2
m2i −dAmisi−
ρ
2
β 2i σ
2
ε (27)
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s.t. ai =
vβi
c
, (28)
mi =
βi−dAsi
k
, (29)
si = b
(N−1)mIi − γw+γ ∑Nj=1 mIj
(N−1)w− γ . (30)
Using the constraints we can again express the program in the following way:
Max
βi
vai−C (βi,si). (31)
Notice that now the inspector’s scrutiny decision si is not contingent on βi because the inspector cannot ob-
serve the contract. Indeed, as shown in expression (30), the inspector’s scrutiny decisions are only contingent
on the inspector’s conjectures regarding the earnings manipulation in all firms, mIj for all j ∈ {1, ...,N}.
All principals solve a program like (31) simultaneously, each one anticipating the decisions of her agent and
those of the inspector, and conjecturing the decisions of all other principals and agents. Obtaining the first
order condition for each principal i results in a system of N equations of the form:
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
f or all i ∈ {1, ...,N}. (32)
Comparing the above first order conditions with the analogous ones in the public contract scenario (19), one
can notice that now the denominator contains only the partial derivative as opposed to the total derivative.
Since in this scenario the inspector cannot observe the contract, the principal cannot affect the inspector’s
scrutiny with the contract choice. Formally, this can be expressed as dsidβi = 0. In other words, while the
inspector conjectures the contract correctly in equilibrium, at the time when the principal chooses the con-
tract, an increase in the contract slope does not induce a more stringent inspection. Taking into account that
in equilibrium all conjectures are true and using the system of equations specified in (32), we can solve for
the equilibrium contracts and decisions in this scenario. The symmetry of the results allows us to write the
marginal cost as ∂Ci∂βi =
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
βPri, where
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
is the same constant we obtained in (25) and βPri is the equi-
librium contract slope common to all contracts in the private contract scenario. Proposition 2 characterizes
the equilibrium in the private contract scenario.
Proposition 2. (Equilibrium with Private Contracts) There exist a unique equilibrium in which contracts
and actions are symmetric across firms. Specifically, αi = αPri and βi = βPri for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, where
αPri =
c
2
a2Pri+
k
2
m2Pri+dAmPrisPri− (vaPri+mPri)βPri+
ρ
2
β 2Priσ
2
ε , (33)
βPri =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
. (34)
Also, the equilibrium effort, earnings management, and scrutiny are given by aPri = a0βPri, mPri = m0βPri,
and sPri = s0βPri.
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Notice that the expressions for the equilibrium agent actions are analogous the the ones in Proposition 1.
The only difference is that here they are contingent on the equilibrium contract slope in this scenario, βPri.
Corollary 2. (i) ∂βPri∂dA > 0; (ii)
∂βPri
∂dP < 0; (iii)
∂βPri
∂k > 0; (iv)
∂βPri
∂w > 0; (v)
∂βPri
∂γ > 0; (vi)
∂βPri
∂N = 0.
Since the inspector cannot observe the contract, the principal does not choose it anticipating a reaction
from the inspector. Therefore, the comparative statics of the pay-performance sensitivity βPri can now
be easily understood as limited to the direct effect that the contract slope has on the principal’s cost. For
instance, an increase in k or dA simply increases the marginal cost of manipulation for the agent, reducing his
incentives to manipulate. Anticipating this, the principal is able to increase βPri inducing less manipulation.
An increase in dP, on the other hand, directly increases the punishment for the principal, who, as a result,
decreases βPri to reduce earnings management. Changes in w and γ now have the same effect. An increase
in w or γ decreases the inspection level leading to lower expected punishments, and that allows the principal
to increase βPri. Lastly, βPri does not change with the number of firms. An increase in the number of firms
reduces the scrutiny that the inspector can allocate to each firm. However, because the principal anticipates
no influence on the inspector’s behavior to start with, the number of firms does not affect the principal’s
equilibrium choice of βPri.
3.3 Comparison across Regimes
In this section, we examine the economic effects of mandating the disclosure of contracts by comparing
the results we obtained under the two scenarios previously analyzed. As stated in Propositions 1 and 2, the
difference in the equilibrium contract slopes (i.e., βPub vs βPri) drives the contrast between other equilibrium
results. For instance, the equilibrium actions, ai, mi, and si, have symmetrical functional forms across
scenarios and they are all linear functions of the equilibrium contract slope in each scenario. Thus, we first
focus on the difference of the contract slopes between scenarios. Such a difference is driven by how the
observability of the contract determines the influence of the contract slope on the level of inspection si. At
the time when the principal determines βi, si is contingent on βi under the public contract, whereas si is
independent of βi under the private contract. This is reflected in the denominator of the expressions for βPub
and βPri in Propositions 1 and 2, respectively. Both denominators contain the term [∂C i/∂βi]o. This term
simply reflect that, in both scenarios, an increase in the contract slope directly increases the incentives for
the agent to manipulate, and that increases the cost for the principal. However, the equilibrium slope in
public contract scenario also contains an additional term, [∂C i/∂ si]odsi/dβi. This additional term indicates that,
if the contract is observable, the marginal cost of providing incentives to the agent is also affected by the
inspector’s reaction to the contract change. We can express the difference between the contract slopes of the
two scenarios as follows:
βPri−βPub
βPriβPub
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
dsi
dβi
Since the inspector always increases the scrutiny of a firm that publicly increases its contract slope, (i.e.,
dsi/dβi > 0), the difference between contract slopes is mainly driven by the marginal cost of scrutiny (i.e.,
[∂C i/∂ si]o). If the cost for the principal increases with scrutiny (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o > 0) then, under the public
17
contract scenario, the principal incurs a larger marginal cost of providing incentives to the agent because the
inspector increases the scrutiny as a reaction to the increase in the contract slope. Therefore, the principal
chooses a smaller slope under the public contract scenario. However, if the cost for the principal decreases
with scrutiny (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o < 0) then the inspector’s reaction allows the principal to increase incentives
for the agent at a lower marginal cost. Thus, the equilibrium contract slope is larger in the public contract
scenario. The following corollary formally states this result:
Corollary 3. βPub ≥ βPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0.
Corollary 3 can be reinterpreted using Lemma 2. If the level of punishment for the principal, dP, is
relatively large compared to that for the agent, dA, then the main effect of an increase in scrutiny is a higher
punishment for the principal (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o > 0). Therefore, the principal reduces the slope to induce a
lower scrutiny from the inspector in the public scenario. If instead the level of punishment for the agent,
dA, is relatively large compared to that for the principal, dP, then the main effect of an increase in scrutiny
is an increase of the marginal cost of manipulation for the agent. That is, scrutiny reduces the cost for the
principal (i.e., [∂C i/∂ si]o < 0), and that allows the principal to increase the contract slope.
We now compare other equilibrium outcomes across the two regimes. As we noted before, the equilib-
rium actions, ai, mi, and si, are all linear functions of βi and are identical across scenarios given the same
contract slope. The intuition for this symmetry is that the only difference between scenarios is the observ-
ability of the contract. The contract observability determines which economic forces the principal perceives
as being are under his influence at the time she chooses the contract. However, in equilibrium all economic
forces are present in both scenarios. Therefore, even though the principal chooses different contract slopes
across scenarios, they play the analogous roles in equilibrium. This same intuition applies to other equilib-
rium outcomes, such as the bonus Bi = βi(vai +mi) and the total compensation Ci = αi +βi(vai +mi) for
the agent. Corollary 4 summarizes the comparison of ai, mi, si, Bi, and Ci between scenarios.
Corollary 4. The equilibrium choices compare across scenarios as follows:
(i) aPub ≥ aPri, mPub ≥ mPri, and sPub ≥ sPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
< 0;
(ii) BPub ≥ BPri and CPub ≥CPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
< 0.
Again, Lemma 2 facilitates the interpretation of Corollary 4. In general, all equilibrium outcomes are
larger under the public contract scenario if the punishment level for the agent is larger than that for the
principal and vice versa.
3.4 Pareto optimal contract
So far, we have compared the two scenarios by examining equilibrium contract slopes, agent decisions, and
inspector scrutiny intensities. However, we still do not know in which scenario a principal is better off. In
this section, we examine a benchmark that is useful to answer such a question. The benchmark examines
the maximization of the aggregate welfare of all participants in the economy, excluding the inspector. Since
agents always break even in expectation, maximizing the aggregate principals’ welfare results in a Pareto
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optimal set of contracts. That is, given such a set of contracts, no other set of contracts can increase the
utility of a principal without reducing the utility of another principal.
One may wonder whether the equilibrium contract sets in the two scenarios previously analyzed are
already Pareto optimal. Take, for instance, the private contract scenario. In such a scenario, a principal
cannot affect the inspector’s scrutiny directly. However, in equilibrium, the inspector’s scrutiny is increasing
in the contract slope, as Proposition 2 reveals. Therefore, in choosing the contract slope, the principal does
not fully consider all the implications that her choice has on her payoff in equilibrium. This consideration
alone already reveals that it should be possible to improve upon the contract in the private scenario. In the
public contract scenario, the optimal contract does not suffer from this shortcoming. Since the contract is
observable by the inspector, the principal already chooses it anticipating the inspector’s reaction. However,
a change in the contract of given firm i not only affects the inspector’s scrutiny of that same firm, si, but
also the scrutiny of all firms in the economy, s j for all j ∈ {1, ...,N}. Thus, each principal’s contract choice
affects all firms in the economy through its effects on the inspector’s scrutiny allocation. Since principals
do not take into account these externalities because they only care about maximizing their own profit, this
lack of coordination among principals reveals that the contracts in the public contract scenario can also be
improved upon.
We obtain the Pareto optimal set of contracts solving a program that maximizes the aggregate payoffs
of all principals in the economy, assuming that contracts are publicly observable. We already derived the
participation and incentive compatibility constraints for the agents applicable to this case in the public con-
tracts scenario: (10), (11), and (12). Formally, the Pareto optimal set of contract is obtained by solving the
program:
Max
{βi}i∈N
N
∑
i=1
vai−C (βi,si(βi)). (35)
s.t.(10),(11), and (12) f or all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, (36)
Solving the program above involves obtaining a set of N first order conditions, one for each principal,
and then solving them simultaneously. Since in equilibrium all contracts are identical across principal-agent
pairs, we simply denote the Pareto optimal contract as {αPO, βPO}. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3. (Pareto Optimal Contract) The Pareto optimal contract is symmetric and consists of a fixed
salary αi = αPO and pay-performance sensitivity βi = βPO for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, given by
αPO =
c
2
a2PO+
k
2
m2PO+dAmPOsPO− (vaPO+mPO)βPO+
ρ
2
β 2POσ
2
ε (37)
βPO =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+∑Nj=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
, (38)
where for j 6= i we have ds jdβi =−
s0kγ
k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA .
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Given the complexity of the expressions, comparing a principal’s expected payoff across scenarios is
very hard to do directly. However, there is an indirect way to do that. The expression for the principal’s
expected payoff in equilibrium is a quadratic function of the equilibrium contract slope. Moreover, the same
function applies to both the private and public contract scenarios. They only differ in the slope chosen by
the principal. This quadratic function has an inverted-U shape with a maximum at the Pareto optimal slope
βPO. The symmetry of quadratic functions around their stationary value allows us to compare the principal’s
payoffs by simply comparing the distance of the contract slopes with βPO. The smaller the distance between
βPO and the slope of the scenario in question, the higher the payoff for the principal.
Comparing the expressions for βPri and βPO, we can derive the following expression:
βPri−βPO
βPOβPri
=
1
v daidβi
N
∑
j=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
, (39)
The expression above tells us that the distance between βPri and βPO is proportional to the product of three
terms. This product reflects the economic effects that are differential between the private contract scenario
and the Pareto optimal derivation. The first term on the right-hand side of the equality is simply the inverse
of the principals’ marginal benefit of increasing the contract slope, which is always positive. The next two
terms are the sum of the marginal costs imposed on all firms in the economy through scrutiny by an increase
in the contract slope of firm i. Each of those marginal costs can be decomposed as the product of two terms.
The first term in each product is the marginal cost of scrutiny for the principal of firm j. From Lemma 2 we
know that the sign of this term can be positive or negative depending on the parameter values. The second
term in each product is the marginal effect that an increase in the contract slope of firm i induces on the
scrutiny of firm j. Of all the terms in the sum, the term containing dsidβi is present because the contract of firm
i is not observable by the inspector in the private contract scenario, whereas we considered it observable in
the derivation of the Pareto optimal contract. That is, it is a differential effect. We know from Lemma 1 that
dsi
dβi > 0. Indeed, if the contract is observable, increasing the contract slope in firm i induces the inspector
to increase the scrutiny of that same firm. The remaining terms in the sum contain ds jdβi for j 6= i, and they
are all the externalities that the contract choice of principal i inflicts on other firms in the economy. They
are present in expression (39) because the principal does not take them into account in the private contract
scenario, whereas they are considered in the derivation of the Pareto optimal contract. All terms ds jdβi for j 6= i
have the opposite sign to that of γ . If γ is positive, the increase in the scrutiny of firm i makes the scrutiny
of other firms more costly for the inspector. Thus, an increase in the contract slope of firm i induces the
inspector to reduce the scrutiny of other firms (i.e., ds jdβi < 0 for j 6= i). If instead γ is negative, the scrutiny
of firm i facilitates the scrutiny of other firms. Consequently, an increase in the contract slope of firm i
induces the inspector to increase the scrutiny of other firms (i.e., ds jdβi > 0 for j 6= i). Since the marginal cost
of scrutiny is symmetric across firms, we can take it out of the sum. The resulting sum, ∑Nj=1
ds j
dβi , turns out
to be always positive. The positivity of the term dsidβi dominates regardless of the sign of γ . Therefore, we
can write,
Sign
[
βPri−βPO
βPOβPri
]
= Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
. (40)
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To compare βPub and βPO we can derive an analogous expression,
βPub−βPO
βPOβPub
=
1
v daidβi
N
∑
j 6=i,
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
, (41)
Notice that the only difference between expression (39) and (41) is that the sum in (41) does not contain
the term
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
dsi
dβi . This is simply because in both, the public contract scenario and the Pareto optimal
derivation, we assumed that the contract is observable by the inspector and, as a result, the principal takes
into account the inspector’s reaction to her contract choice. Therefore, this effect is not differential. Only
the externalities considered in the Pareto optimal contract are differential. Since all the terms ds jdβi for j 6= i
have the opposite sign to that of γ , we can write:
Sign
[
βPub−βPO
βPOβPub
]
=−Sign[γ]Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
. (42)
Essentially, the Pareto optimal derivation takes into account all the effects that the contract choice has on
the economy. Principals, however, never take into account the externalities of their choices on other firms.
This lack of coordination between principals yields a loss of surplus in all firms in the economy, reducing
economic efficiency regardless of the contract observability. Yet, the non-observability of the contract poses
another efficiency hurdle for the principal in the private contract scenario. The principal cannot influence
the inspector’s reaction, and that prevents her from adjusting the agent’s incentives to her anticipation of
the inspector’s scrutiny. Such inefficiencies can only be absent or inconsequential in extreme cases. For
instance, if there is only one firm in the economy (N = 1), or there are multiple firms but the inspector’s
cost of scrutiny of one firm is unrelated to the scrutiny of other firms (γ = 0), then externalities are muted.
Similarly, if the number of firms in the economy is very large (N→∞), the effect of each principal’s contract
choice on the inspector’s scrutiny allocation becomes atomic and, thus, externalities also become immaterial.
In all these scenarios, the absence (the less severity) of externalities leads the equilibrium contract in the
public contract scenario (closer) to the Pareto optimal contract. However, the equilibrium contract in the
private contract scenario still suffers distortions because of the non-observability of the contract. As a result,
in these three extreme cases, principals are better off in the public contract scenario than in the private
contract scenario. Proposition 4 compares the principal’s welfare across scenarios in the absence and the
less severity of externalities.
Proposition 4. In extreme situations in which there are no or less severe externalities, principals obtain a
higher payoff in the public contract scenario than in the private contract scenario. Specifically, let
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
6=
0, if γ = 0, N = 1,or N→∞, then principals are better off with public contracts than with private contracts.
If instead
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= 0, principals are indifferent between scenarios.
If there are at least two firms in the economy, the number of firms is finite, and γ 6= 0, we need to take
into account the contract distortions due to both the coordination problems among principals and the non-
observability of private contracts. The following proposition states the comparison of the principal’s payoffs
across scenarios in this case:
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Proposition 5. If the number of firms in the economy is N ∈ N\{1} and γ 6= 0, the comparison of the
principal’s welfare is as follows. If
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
6= 0,
(i) For γ ≤ w2 , principals are better off with public contracts;
(ii) There exists γ¯ > w2 such that principals are better off with private contracts for γ > γ¯
To interpret the results in Proposition 5 in a intuitive way, it is convenient to first cover the case of
a negative γ . If γ < 0 then from expressions (40) , (42), and Lemma 2 we can derive that if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0
then βPO < βPub < βPri. Indeed, if the marginal cost of scrutiny is positive, the principal chooses a larger
contract slope with private contracts. If the contract is observable, increasing the incentives for the agent
induces a more intense scrutiny, which is more costly for the principal. Moreover, since γ < 0, increasing the
contract slope facilitates the scrutiny of other firms, which also translates into higher costs for the principals.
Therefore, the Pareto optimal contract must have the smallest slope. If
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= 0 then βPub = βPO = βPri.
If scrutiny is not costly, the observability of the contract is irrelevant and externalities have no economic
impact. Therefore, the three equilibrium contract slopes become identical. Finally, if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0 then
βPri < βPub < βPO. If scrutiny saves costs to the principal, then contract observability allows the principal
to increase the contract slope by inducing a more intense scrutiny. Also, since γ < 0, the increased scrutiny
facilitates the scrutiny of other firms which, in this case, saves them costs. Therefore, the Pareto optimal
slope is the largest one. Overall, if γ < 0, then principals are always better off in the public contract scenario
because the contract distortion is smaller.
The case of a positive γ is more nuanced. If γ > 0 and
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 then βPub < βPO < βPri. In this case,
βPO is smaller than βPri because the observability of the contract induces a more intense scrutiny, which is
costly for the principal. So, the principal tries to mitigate the punishment by reducing the slope. However,
βPub is even smaller than βPO because increasing the contract slope increases scrutiny in the same firm but
decreases it in other firms. Therefore, taking into account externalities, the perceived scrutiny increases at a
lower pace, which allows for a larger contract slope in the Pareto optimal contract. If instead
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0 ,
then βPri < βPO < βPub. In this case, βPri is smaller than βPO because the more intense scrutiny generated by
the contract observability saves costs to the principal. Finally, βPub is larger than βPO because an increase in
the contract slope induces a lower scrutiny in other firms, which saves them less costs. Therefore, internaliz-
ing the externalities leads to a decrease in the optimal contract slope. So, if γ > 0, the Pareto optimal contract
slope lies always in the middle, which complicates assessing which scenario provides the highest payoff for
the principal. The difference between βPub and βPO is only due to the externalities. For a small gamma
(0 ≤ γ ≤ w2 ), externalities are small. Indeed, in the limit as γ → 0, externalities disappear, and βPub = βPO.
Thus, it is clear that βPub is very close to βPO for small γ . However, the distance between βPri and βPO is
due to externalities and also to the observability of the contract. While externalities also become irrelevant
as γ→ 0, the contract observability is still relevant, so βPri does not converge to βPO. In essence, for γ→ 0,
we converge to a setting equivalent to the one single firm setting, with βPub = βPO 6= βPri. Therefore, the
principal is always better off with public contracts. For a large positive γ (w > γ > γ¯ > w2 ) externalities are
important. However, the distance between βPri and βPO also reflects the fact that the contract is not observ-
able in the private scenario. With a positive γ , while the observability of the contract induces a more intense
scrutiny, that same slope increase reduces the scrutiny in other firms. Because of the opposite sign of the
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two effects, the private contract slope is closer to the Pareto optimal contract slope, and therefore yields a
higher payoff for the principal.
4 Welfare Analysis
4.1 Social Welfare
We now examine the set of contracts that maximizes social welfare, and denote such contract as by {αSW , βSW}.
We define welfare as the sum of the principals’s and the inspector’s payoffs. However, once we include the
inspector in the economy, external punishments become wealth transfers from principals and agents to the
inspector. To keep the setting tractable, we assume that b = dA + dP. That is, the benefit that the inspector
obtains from scrutinizing a firm is equal to the the external punishments the firm suffers. The the set of
contracts that maximizes social welfare is achieved by solving the program:
Max
{βi}i∈N
N
∑
i=1
vai−C (βi,si(βi))+ I(βi,si(βi)). (43)
s.t.(10),(11), and (12) f or all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, (44)
where I(βi,si(βi)) = b∑Ni=1 mi(βi)si(βi)− w2 ∑Ni=1 si(βi)2− γ2(N−1) ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1, j 6=i si(βi)s j(β j) is the inspector’s
payoff. Taking derivatives with respect to βi yields a system of N first order conditions. Comparing the
first order conditions with the ones in the Pareto optimal contract, there is an additional term dI(βi,si(βi))dβi =
b∑Nj=1
dm j
dβi s j that is derived from the inspector’s payoff. This reflects the fact that the inspector’s marginal
benefit of scrutiny increases with βi since earnings management increases with βi. Thus, βSW is greater than
βPO.
Proposition 6 characterizes the welfare maximizing contract.
Proposition 6. (Welfare Maximizing Contract) The contract that maximizes social welfare is symmetric and
consists of a fixed salary αi = αSW and pay-performance sensitivity βi = βSW for all i ∈ {1, ...,N} given by,
αSW =
c
2
a2SW +
k
2
m2SW +dAmSW sSW − (vaSW +mSW )βSW +
ρ
2
β 2SWσ
2
ε , (45)
βSW =
v daidβi
ca0 ∂ai∂βi +ρσ
2
ε +∑Nj=1
(
km0
dm j
dβi +(w+ γ)s0
ds j
dβi
) (46)
=
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+∑Nj=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi −bs0∑Nj=1
dm j
dβi
. (47)
Note that the resulting optimal contract chosen by the social planner has a contract slope, βSW , that is
greater than βPri and βPub because the inspector’s payoff increases with a contract slope, leading to larger
social welfare. Accordingly, the public contract results in a smaller (larger) distortion in βi when βPub > (<
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)βPri. Proposition 7 states the comparison of the social welfare between the private contract and the public
contract scenarios.
Proposition 7. The social welfare is larger (smaller) under public contract if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0.
Proposition 7 states that the welfare implications of mandating contract disclosure are mainly determined
by the marginal cost of scrutiny for the firm. Indeed, if the firm is marginally harmed by the inspector’s
scrutiny, it is better to mandate contracts to be disclosed.
5 Empirical Implications
Our findings provide new insights on the growing literature on executive compensation which has come
under enormous scrutiny and received lots of attention recently. The U. S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) has been exerting effort to improve transparency of executive compensation and provide
investors with comprehensive and comprehensible information on a company’s financial transactions with
management. The disclosure of executive compensation has been required since 1934 (Securities Exchange
Act of 1934) and its revision was enacted in 1992 (SEC, 1992). In 2006, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
noted that “Our job is to ensure that investors have available to them all of the compensation information
they need, presented in a clear and understandable form that they can use” in his speech (Cox, 2006), and the
SEC introduced a new requirement that companies prepare a thorough and comprehensive Compensation
Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) (SEC, 2006A, 2006B). Although our model discusses the public and pri-
vate contract scenarios explicitly, we can extend our results and intuition to the cases in which firms provide
more or less information about executive contracts.
First, (more) disclosure of contract increases pay-performance sensitivity, the amount of earnings man-
agement, and the total amount of compensation for firms whose internal controls are relatively weak or
punishment for detected earnings manipulation to principals is weak relative to that to agent, compared to
nondisclosure (or less disclosure) of contract. One can compare pay-performance sensitivity, the amount of
earnings management, and the total amount of compensation before and after regulations requiring disclo-
sure or more detailed information of contracts.11 Second, our model offers a rationale for a cross-sectional
variation of pay-performance sensitivity in each contract scenario (i.e., before/after the adoption of con-
tract disclosure, or when providing less or more information on compensation contract). In both contract
scenarios, we predict that pay-performance sensitivity is larger when punishment for detected earnings ma-
nipulation to the agent (the principal) is larger (smaller) and the internal control is stronger. For tests, one
may compare pay-performance sensitivity in firms that have different qualities of audit committee and gov-
ernance or when there is a change in penalty for managers or companies (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002). The effects of the cost of inspection including the direct cost and externality are not monotonic in the
public contract scenario. When punishment for detected earnings manipulation to the agent (the principal) is
11Ferri, Zheng, and Zou (2017) find no evidence of a change in discretionary accruals for their full-sample regression. They
argue that this might result from a change of the cost of earnings manipulation. We provide more explanations in this regard and
offer ways to conduct empirical tests for a change of earnings management.
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negligible, pay-performance sensitivity increases (decreases) with the direct cost of inspection. If the inter-
nal control is relatively strong (weak), pay-performance sensitivity increases (decreases) with the magnitude
of externality as the magnitude of externality is very small or the number of peer firms is very large. Also,
pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the magnitude of externality as the internal control is very weak.
In addition, in the presence of externality of scrutiny, pay-performance sensitivity is expected to increase
(decrease) with the number of peer firms when the internal control is relatively strong (weak) or punishment
for detected earnings manipulation to principals is large (small) relative to that to agent in the public contract
scenario. In contrast, in the private contract scenario, pay-performance sensitivity monotonically increases
with the cost of inspection including both the direct cost and externality and are independent of the number
of peer firms. For tests, the direct cost of inspection can be proxied by the resources/difficulties with which
the inspector can scrutinize. The level of requirements for derivative suit can be an example. The level of
externality can be measured by the qualities or ways of earnings management commonly committed in in-
dustries or in the market. For instance, if the inspector is investigating a new type of earnings management,
the inspector can learn by doing it and the inspection of one firm can be complement to that of other firms.
The number of peer firms can be proxied by the number of firms under the same inspector or supervisor, or
the number of peer firms in the same industry or in a competing market.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of contract disclosure on the optimal incentive contract in multiple principal-
agent relationships. After signing the contract, each agent exerts productive effort and engages in earnings
management. The inspector allocates its resources to uncover earnings management and the scrutiny is in-
terdependent across firms in that the inspection of one firm can complement or substitute that of other firms.
In the public contract scenario, the principal can commit to a Stackelberg leader action but observability
of contract can induce more severe coordination problems across firms in that their contracts influence the
inspector’s scrutiny. In a private contract scenario, on the other hand, the principal has no means of commit-
ting to a Stackelberg leader action but unobservability can alleviate coordination problems. We discuss the
factors that affect the tradeoff between the two contract scenarios.
Standard setters have been pushing forward to enhance transparency of executive contracts, which has
been presumed to improve corporate governance and prevent excessive pay. On the contrary to conventional
wisdom, our paper highlights that contract disclosure may result in unintended consequences because co-
ordination problems may induce losses to shareholders and social welfare. Contract disclosure needs to be
viewed as a two-edged sword. It has benefits of providing more information to the market as documented
in prior literature. However, it encompasses costs of exacerbating coordination problems among firms. Our
study suggests that regulators need to carefully consider the effect of externality of executive pay disclosure
in that it may create coordination problems among firms in designing their optimal contracts.
25
References
[1] Aggarwal, R. K. and A. A. Samwick, 1999, Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and
Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence, Journal of Finance 54 (6): 1999-2043.
[2] Armstrong, C.S., C. D. Ittner, and D. F. Larcker, 2012, Corporate Governance, Compensation Consul-
tants, and CEO Pay Levels, Review of Accounting Studies 17 (2): 322-351.
[3] Baker, G. P, M. C. Jensen, and K. J. Murphy, 1988, Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory,
Journal of Finance 43 (3): 593-616.
[4] Bebchuk, L. A. and J. M. Fried, 2003, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 17 (3): 71 -92.
[5] Bebchuk, L.A., J. M. Fried, and D. I. Walker, 2002, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review 69 (3): 751- 846.
[6] Bertrand, M., and S. Mullainathan, 2001, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones without Principals
Are, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (3): 901-932.
[7] Bloomfield, M. J., 2018, Compensation Disclosures and the Weaponization of Executive Pay: Evi-
dence from Revenue-Based Performance Evaluation, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
[8] Bozanic, Z., J. L. Hoopes, J. R. Thornock, and B. M. Williams, 2017, IRS Attention, Journal of
Accounting Research 55 (1): 79–114.
[9] Brander, J. A. and T. R. Lewis, 1986, Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect,
American Economic Review 76 (5): 956–970.
[10] Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer, 1983, Strategic Commitment with R&D: the Symmetric Case, Bell
Journal of Economics 14 (1): 225–235.
[11] Brander, J. A. and B. J. Spencer, 1985, Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,
Journal of International Economics 18 (1-2): 83-100.
[12] Card, D., A. Mas, E. Moretti, and E. Saez, 2012, Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on
Job Satisfaction, American Economic Review 102 (6): 2981-3003.
[13] Chen, Q., B. Mittendorf, Y. Zhang, 2010, Endogenous Accounting Bias When Decision Making and
Control Interact, Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (4): 1–29.
[14] Core, J. E., R. W. Holthausen, and D. F. Larker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer
Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3): 371-406.
[15] Corona, C. and R. Randhawa, 2010, The Auditor’s Slippery Slope: An Analysis of Reputational In-
centives, Management Science 56 (6): 924-937.
26
[16] Corona, C. and R. Randhawa, 2018, The Value of Confession: Admitting Mistakes to Build Reputa-
tion, The Accounting Review 93 (3): 133-161.
[17] Cox, C., 2006, Speech by SEC Chairman: Chairman’s Opening Statement; Proposed Re-
visions to the Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure Rules, Available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch011706cc.htm.
[18] Craighead, J. A., M. L. Magnan, and L. Thorne, 2004, The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on
Performance-Based CEO Compensation, Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (2): 369-98.
[19] Dye, R., B. Balachandran, and R. Magee, 1990, Contingent Fees for Audit Firms, Journal of Account-
ing Research 28 (2): 239-266.
[20] Dye, R., 1993, Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth, Journal of Political Economy
101 (5): 887-914.
[21] Dye, R., 1995. Incorporation of the Audit Market, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19 (1): 75-
114.
[22] Dye, R. A., 2002, Classifications Manipulation and Nash Accounting Standards, Journal of Accounting
Research 40 (4): 1125–1162.
[23] Ewert, R. and A. Wagenhofer, 2016, Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality
and Audit Quality, Journal of Accounting Research 57 (1): 121-168.
[24] Faulkender, M. and J. Yang, 2013, Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics
of Compensation Peer Benchmarking, Review of Financial Studies 26 (3): 806-839.
[25] Fellingham, J., and P. Newman, 1985, Strategic Considerations in Auditing, The Accounting Review
60 (4): 634-650.
[26] Ferri, F., R. Zheng, and Y. Zou, 2018, Uncertainty about Managers’ Reporting Objectives and In-
vestors’ Response to Earnings Reports: Evidence from the 2006 Executive Compensation Disclosures,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 66 (2-3): 339–365.
[27] Fershtman, C. and K. L. Judd, 1987, Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly. American Economic Review
77 (5): 927–940.
[28] Frydman, C. and D. Jenter, 2010, CEO Compensation, Annual Review of Financial Economics 2:
75-102.
[29] Gartenberg, C. M. and J. Wulf, 2014, Pay Harmony: Peer Comparison and Executive Compensation,
Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 13-041.
[30] Gipper, B., 2017, The Economic Effects of Mandating Expanded Compensation Disclosures, Working
Paper, Stanford University.
27
[31] Hayes, R. M. and S. Schaefer, 2008, CEO pay and Lake Wobegon Effect, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 94 (2): 280-290.
[32] Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 2012, Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance, Journal of
Finance 67 (1): 195-233.
[33] Hillegeist, S. A., 1999, Financial Reporting and Auditing under Alternative Damage Apportionment
Rules, The Accounting Review 74 (3): 347-369.
[34] Jensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy, 1990, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, Journal of
Political Economy 98 (2): 225-264.
[35] Katz, M. L., 1991, Game-playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments, RAND Journal
of Economics 22 (3): 307–328.
[36] Kedia, S., 2006, Estimating Product Market Competition: Methodology and Application, Journal of
Banking and Finance 30 (3): 875–894.
[37] Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott, 1977, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal
Plans, Journal of Political Economy 85 (3): 473–491.
[38] Laux, C. and V. Laux, 2009, Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management, The
Accounting Review 84 (3):869-891.
[39] Laux, V. and P. C. Stocken, 2018, Accounting Standards, Regulatory Enforcement, and Innovation,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 65 (2-3): 221–236.
[40] Lo, K., 2003, Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The Case of Executive
Compensation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 35 (3): 285–314.
[41] Liang, P. J., 2004, Equilibrium Earnings Management, Incentive Contracts, and Accounting Standards,
Contemporary Accounting Research 21(3): 685–718.
[42] Maksimovic, V., 1988, Capital Structure in a Repeated Oligopoly, Rand Journal of Economics 19 (3):
389-407.
[43] Mas, A., 2016, Does Disclosure Affect CEO Pay Setting? Evidence from the Passage of the 1934
Securities and Exchange Act, Working Paper, Princeton University.
[44] Mas, A., 2017, Does Transparency Lead to Pay Compression?, Journal of Political Economy 125 (5):
1683-1721.
[45] Murphy, K. J., 1999, Executive compensation, Handbook of Labor Economics 3: 2485-2563.
[46] Murphy, K.J., 2013, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, Handbook of
the Economics of Finance: 211-356.
28
[47] Pae, S. and S. Yoo, 2001, Strategic Interaction in Auditing: An Analysis of Auditors’ Legal Liability,
Internal Control System Quality, and Audit Effort, The Accounting Review 76 (3): 333-356.
[48] Park, Y. W., T. Nelson, and M. R. Huson, 2001, Executive Pay and the Disclosure scenario: Canadian
Evidence, Journal of Financial Research 24 (3): 347-365.
[49] Schmidt, C., 2012, Does Transparency Increase Executive Compensation?, Working paper, Norwegian
School of Economics.
[50] Schwartz, R., 1997, Legal Regimes, Audit Quality, and Investment, The Accounting Review 72 (3):
385-406.
[51] SEC, 1992, Executive Compensation Disclosure (Final Rules), Release No. 33-6962, Federal Register
57 No. 204, 57 CFR 48126-56.
[52] SEC, 1999, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 – Materiality: Release No SAB 99, Available at
https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm.
[53] SEC, 2005, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure, Press Release, Available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.
[54] SEC, 2006A, Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure: Release No 33-8655, Available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33- 8655.pdf.
[55] SEC, 2006B, Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure: Release No 33-8732A, Avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf.
[56] Shue, K., 2013, Executive networks and firm policies: Evidence from the random assignment of MBA
peers, Review of Financial Studies 26 (6): 1401-1442.
[57] Shue, K. and R. R. Townsend, 2015, Growth Through Rigidity: An Explanation of the Rise of CEO
Pay, Journal of Financial Economics 123 (1): 1-21.
[58] Yeaton, K., 2007, The SEC’s New Rules on Executive Compensation, The CPA Journal: 26-33.
Appendix: Proof
Proof of Lemma 1
It follows immediately from (10), (11), and (12).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
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The principal maximizes her expected payoff in (16) subject to the constraints in (6), (8), and (10). The
principal’s problem can be expressed as follows:
Max
βi
vai(βi)−C (βi,si(βi)), (48)
where C (βi,si(βi)) = c2 ai(βi)
2+ k2 mi(βi,si)
2+(dP+dA)mi(βi,si)si(βi)+ ρ2β
2
i σ2ε . Taking derivatives of (48)
with respect to βi yields a system of N equations of the form: for all i ∈ {1, ...,N},
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
+
∂Ci
∂ si
dsi
dβi
, (49)
where ∂Ci∂βi = cai
∂ai
∂βi + kmi
∂mi
∂βi +(dA + dP)si
∂mi
∂βi +βiρσ
2
ε ,
∂Ci
∂ si = kmi
∂mi
∂ si +(dA + dP)(si
∂mi
∂ si +mi), and
dsi
dβi =
b(N−1)− bk(w+γ)+bdA kγ
k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA .
Using the fact that ai =
vβi
c , mi = ((N− 1)w− γ)Ψβi + bdAΓB and si = b(N− 1)Ψβi− bkΓB, where
Ψ = (k(w+γ)+bdA)(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) , Γ =
γ
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) , and B = ∑
N
j=1β j, the above
equations can be rearranged to show that the expressions of βi are a function of B and are identical for all
i ∈ {1, ...,N}, which confirms that the equilibrium βi is symmetric for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}.
The symmetry of the equilibrium yields ai = a0βi, mi = m0βi, and si = s0βi, where a0 = vc , m0 =
(w+γ)
k(w+γ)+bdA , and s0 =
b
k(w+γ)+bdA and thus
∂Ci
∂βi =
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
βi and ∂Ci∂ si =
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
βi. Finally, the unique sym-
metric equilibrium is
βi =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
dsi
dβi
. (50)
The second order condition is satisfied: d
2EP[Vi]
dβ 2i
=−c ∂ai∂βi
∂ai
∂βi −k
dmi
dβi
dmi
dβi −(dA+dP)(
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi +
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi )−ρσ2ε <
0.
αi is obtained from the participant constraint for the agent. Substituting the equilibrium βi into the
expressions for ai, mi, and si yields aPub, mPub, and sPub as stated in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
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Note that [
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= km0
∂mi
∂ si
+(dA+dP)(
∂mi
∂ si
s0+m0)> 0 (51)
⇐⇒(dA+dP)m0 >−(km0+(dA+dP)s0)∂mi∂ si (52)
⇐⇒dPm0 > dAk (dA+dP)s0 (53)
⇐⇒dP(w+ γ)k > dA(dA+dP)b (54)
⇐⇒k > bdA(dA+dP)
dP(w+ γ)
(55)
⇐⇒dA < ψ(dP) =−dP2 +
1
2
√
d2P+
4dPk(w+ γ)
b
(56)
where ∂ψ(dP)∂dP =−12 +
√
b
√
dP
4
√
bdP+4k(r+w)
+
√
bdP+4k(r+w)
4
√
b
√
dP
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
(i) From Proposition 1, we obtain
βPub =
v daidβi
ca0 ∂ai∂βi + km0
dmi
dβi +(dA+dP)(
dmi
dβi s0+m0
dsi
dβi )+ρ(σ
2
η +σ2ε )
(57)
where dmidβi =
(w− γ(N−1) )(k(w+γ)+bdA)+b γ(N−1)dA
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k(w− γ(N−1) )+bdA)
and dsidβi =
b((k(w+γ)+bdA)−k γ(N−1) )
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k(w− γ(N−1) )+bdA)
. Then it follows that ∂βPub∂dA >
0, ∂βPub∂dP < 0, and
∂βPub
∂k > 0.
(ii) (a) It follows from the fact that Sign[ lim
dA→0
∂βPub
∂w ]> 0;
(b) It follows from the fact that Sign[ lim
dP→0
∂βPub
∂w ]> 0.
(iii) (a) It follows from the fact that Sign[ lim
dA→0
∂βPub
∂γ ] = Sign[
(−γ2(I−3)+(I−1)2w2−4γ(I−1)w)];
(b) It follows from the fact that Sign[ lim
dP→0
∂βPub
∂γ ] = Sign[−(b2(I−1)2d2A+b(I−1)kdA(γ(I−5)+2(I−
1)w)+ k2
(−2γ2(I−2)+(I−1)2w2+ γ (I2−6I+5)w))];
(c) It follows from the fact that Sign[lim
γ→0
∂βPub
∂γ ] = Sign[−(bdA (dA+dP)− kwdP)].
(iv) It follows from the fact that Sign[ ∂βPub∂N ] = Sign[−γ2(bdA (dA+dP)− k(w+ γ)dP)].
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
The principal maximizes her expected payoff in (27) subject to the constraints in (28) - (30). Taking
derivatives of (31) with respect to βi yields a system of N equations of the form: for all i ∈ {1, ...,N},
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
. (58)
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Using the fact that ai =
vβi
c , mi = ((N−1)w− γ)Ψβi +bdAΓB and si = b(N−1)Ψβi−bkΓB, whereΨ =
1
k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA , Γ =
γ
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) , and B = ∑
N
j=1β j, the above equations can be
rearranged to show that the expressions of βi are a function of B and are identical for all i∈ {1, ...,N}, which
confirms that the equilibrium βi is symmetric for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}.
The symmetry of the equilibrium yields ai = a0βi, mi = m0βi, and si = s0βi, where a0 = vc , m0 =
(w+γ)
k(w+γ)+bdA , and s0 =
b
k(w+γ)+bdA and thus
∂Ci
∂βi =
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
βi. Finally, the unique symmetric equilibrium is
βi =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
. (59)
The second order condition is satisfied: ∂
2EP[Vi]
∂β 2i
=−c ∂ai∂βi
∂ai
∂βi − k
∂mi
∂βi
∂mi
∂βi −ρσ2ε < 0.
αi is obtained from the participant constraint for the agent. Substituting the equilibrium βi into the
expressions for ai, mi, and si yields aPri, mPri, and sPri as stated in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2
Using daidβi =
v
c ,
∂mi
∂βi =
1
k , a0 =
v
c , m0 =
(w+γ)
k(w+γ)+bdA , and s0 =
b
k(w+γ)+bdA , rearranging the expression of βPri
in Proposition 2 yields βPri =
v2
c
v2
c +
1
k+
bdP
k(k(w+γ)+bdA)
+ρσ2ε
, which immediately leads to (i)-(vi).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3
From Proposition 1 and 2, the difference between the contract slopes of the two scenarios can be ex-
pressed as follows:
βPri−βPub
βPriβPub
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
dsi
dβi
(60)
Because dsidβi > 0, the difference between contract slopes is mainly driven by the marginal cost of scrutiny
(i.e.,
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
). Therefore, βPub ≥ βPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4
(i) It follows immediately from Proposition 1 and 2 and Corollary 3.
(ii) Note that Bi = βi(vai+mi)= β 2i [
v2
c +
(w+γ)
k(w+γ)+bdA ]> 0 and Ci =αi+βi(vai+mi)=
1
2β
2
i [
v2
c − k(w+γ)
2
(k(w+γ)+bdA)2
+
2(w+γ)
k(w+γ)+bdA +ρσ
2
ε ]> 0. By Corollary 3, we have BPub ≥ BPri and CPub ≥CPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
< 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The Pareto optimal set of contracts solves a program that maximizes the aggregate payoffs of all princi-
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pals in the economy, assuming that contracts are publicly observable.
Max
{βi}i∈N
N
∑
i=1
vai−C (βi,si(βi)) (61)
Taking derivatives with respect to βi yields a system of N equations of the form: for all i ∈ {1, ...,N},
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
+
N
∑
j=1
∂C j
∂ s j
ds j
dβi
. (62)
Using the fact that ai =
vβi
c , mi = ((N− 1)w− γ)Ψβi + bdAΓB and si = b(N− 1)Ψβi− bkΓB, where
Ψ = (k(w+γ)+bdA)(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) , Γ =
γ
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) , and B = ∑
N
j=1β j, the above
equations can be rearranged to show that the expressions of βi are a function of B and are identical for all
i ∈ {1, ...,N}, which confirms that the equilibrium βi is symmetric for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}. Finally, the unique
symmetric equilibrium is
βi =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+∑Nj=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
. (63)
The second order condition is satisfied: d
2∑Ni=1 EP[Vi]
dβ 2i
=−c ∂ai∂βi
∂ai
∂βi −k
dmi
dβi (
dmi
dβi +∑
N
j 6=i
dm j
dβi )−(dA+dP)(
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi +
∑Nj 6=i
dm j
dβi
ds j
dβi +
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi +∑
N
j 6=i
dm j
dβi
ds j
dβi )−ρσ2ε < 0.
αi is obtained from the participant constraint for the agent. Substituting the equilibrium βi into the
expressions for ai, mi, and si yields aPO, mPO, and sPO as stated in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
First, if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
= 0, βPub = βPri = βPO by (39) - (42) and thus principals are indifferent between thr
two scenarios. Second, suppose
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
6= 0. When there is no externality of inspection (i.e., γ = 0) or the
number of firms in the economy N is 1, βPub = βPO and βPri 6= βPO by (39) - (42). Hence, the principal is
better off under public contracts if γ = 0 or N = 1. Next, consider the case in which the number of firms in
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the economy N is ∞ and γ 6= 0. Note that
βPri−βPO
βPOβPri
=
1
v daidβi
N
∑
j=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
N
∑
j=1
ds j
dβi
(64)
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
(b(N−1)Ψ −NbkΓ ) (65)
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
b
k(w+ γ)+bdA
(66)
βPub−βPO
βPOβPub
=
1
v daidβi
N
∑
j 6=i,
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
N
∑
j 6=i,
ds j
dβi
(67)
=
1
v daidβi
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
(−1)(N−1)bkΓ (68)
because si = b(N−1)Ψβi−bkΓB, whereΨ = (k(w+γ)+bdA)(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) ,Γ =
γ
(k(w+γ)+bdA)(k((N−1)w−γ)+(N−1)bdA) ,
and B = ∑Nj=1β j. This confirms that (40) and (42) hold when N→ ∞.
If γ < 0, βPO > βPub > βPri for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0 and βPO < βPub < βPri for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0, by Corollary 3, (39)
- (42), and the properties above. Thus, the principal is better off under public contracts if γ < 0. If γ > 0,
βPri > βPO > βPub for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 and βPri < βPO < βPub for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. Observe that as N→ ∞,
Sign[(βPri−βPO)− (βPO−βPub)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
> 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 (69)
Sign[(βPub−βPO)− (βPO−βPri)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
< 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. (70)
Thus, the principal is better off under public contracts if γ > 0. In sum, the principal is better off under
public contracts when the number of firms in the economy N is ∞ and γ 6= 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
If γ < 0, βPO > βPub > βPri for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0 and βPO < βPub < βPri for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0, by Corollary 3, (39)
- (42), and the properties above. Thus, the principal is better off under public contracts if γ < 0. If γ > 0,
βPri > βPO > βPub for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 and βPri < βPO < βPub for
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. Note that
Sign[(βPri−βPO)− (βPO−βPub)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
Sign [Γ (γ)] f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 (71)
Sign[(βPub−βPO)− (βPO−βPri)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
Sign [Γ (γ)] f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. (72)
where Γ (γ) = (N− 1)[c(k(w+ γ)+bdA) 2((k(w− γ)+ bdA)− k γ(N−1))( v
2
c +
1
k + ρ(σ
2
ε ))− cbdAk {2k(k(w+
γ)(w− γ(N−1)) + bwdA) + bdA(k(w+ γ) + bdA− k γ(N−1))}+ 2cb(dA + dP)(k(w+ γ)(w− γ(N−1)) + bwdA)].
First, observe that Γ (γ)> 0 if 0 < γ ≤ w2 . Second, if w > γ > w2 , there exists γ¯ (> w2 ) such that Γ (γ)< 0 for
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γ > γ¯ , because Γ (γ) is a cubic function of γ and its coefficient on γ3 is negative. Therefore, if 0 < γ ≤ w2 ,
Sign[(βPri−βPO)− (βPO−βPub)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
> 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 (73)
Sign[(βPub−βPO)− (βPO−βPri)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
< 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. (74)
and if γ > γ¯ (> w2 ),
Sign[(βPri−βPO)− (βPO−βPub)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
< 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
> 0 (75)
Sign[(βPub−βPO)− (βPO−βPri)] = Sign
[[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
]
> 0 f or
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. (76)
Proof of Proposition 6
The social planner maximizes the sum of principals’ expected payoffs
Max
{βi}i∈N
N
∑
i=1
vai−C (βi,si(βi))+ I(βi,si(βi)) (77)
where I(βi,si(βi)) = b∑Ni=1 mi(βi)si(βi)− w2 ∑Ni=1 si(βi)2− γ2(N−1) ∑Ni=1∑Nj=1, j 6=i si(βi)s j(β j) is the inspector’s
payoff.
Taking derivatives with respect to βi yields a system of N equations of the form: for all i ∈ {1, ...,N},
v
dai
dβi
=
∂Ci
∂βi
+
N
∑
j=1
∂C j
∂ s j
ds j
dβi
−b
N
∑
j=1
dm j
dβi
s j. (78)
where the last term is derived by applying the envelop theorem to the inspector’s expected payoff, i.e.,
dI(βi,si(βi))
dβi =
∂ I(βi,si(βi))
∂βi = b∑
N
j=1
dm j
dβi s j. Similarly, the above equations can be rearranged to show that the
expressions of βi are a function of B and are identical for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}, which confirms that the equilib-
rium βi is symmetric for all i ∈ {1, ...,N}. Finally, the unique symmetric equilibrium is
βi =
v daidβi[
∂Ci
∂βi
]
o
+∑Nj=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi −bs0∑Nj=1
dm j
dβi
. (79)
The second order condition is satisfied provided that b = dA + dP,
d2∑Ni=1 EP[Vi]
dβ 2i
= −c ∂ai∂βi
∂ai
∂βi − k
dmi
dβi (
dmi
dβi +
∑Nj 6=i
dm j
dβi )−(dA+dP)(
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi +∑
N
j 6=i
dm j
dβi
ds j
dβi +
dmi
dβi
dsi
dβi +∑
N
j 6=i
dm j
dβi
ds j
dβi )−ρσ2ε +b∑Nj=1
dm j
dβi
ds j
dβi +∑
N
j=1
∂ 2I
∂ s2j
(
ds j
dβi )
2 <
0.
αi is obtained from the participant constraint for the agent. Substituting the equilibrium βi into the
expressions for ai, mi, and si yields aSW , mSW , and sSW as stated in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 7
First, observe that
βPri−βPO
βPOβPri
=
1
v daidβi
(
N
∑
j=1
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
−bs0
N
∑
j=1
dm j
dβi
) (80)
=
1
v daidβi
[(km0
∂mi
∂ si
+(dA+dP)(
∂mi
∂ si
s0+m0))
N
∑
j=1
ds j
dβi
−bs0
N
∑
j=1
dm j
dβi
] (81)
=
1
v daidβi
[(−dAm0+(dA+dP)(−dAk s0+m0))s0−bs0m0] (82)
=
1
v daidβi
(−dAm0+(dA+dP)(−dAk s0))s0 < 0 (83)
βPub−βPO
βPOβPub
=
1
v daidβi
(
N
∑
j 6=i,
[
∂C j
∂ s j
]
o
ds j
dβi
−bs0
N
∑
j=1
dm j
dβi
) (84)
=
1
v daidβi
[(km0
∂mi
∂ si
+(dA+dP)(
∂mi
∂ si
s0+m0))
N
∑
j 6=i,
ds j
dβi
−bs0
N
∑
j=1
dm j
dβi
] (85)
=
1
v daidβi
[(−dAm0+(dA+dP)(−dAk s0+m0))(−
γbk
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(k(w− γN−1)+bdA)
)−bs0 (w+ γ)k(w+ γ)+bdA ]
(86)
=
1
v daidβi
[(dPm0))(− γbk
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(k(w− γN−1)+bdA)
) (87)
=+(dA+dP)s0(
γbdA
(k(w+ γ)+bdA)(k(w− γN−1)+bdA)
− (w+ γ)
k(w+ γ)+bdA
]< 0 (88)
Therefore,
βSW > βPub (89)
βSW >βPri. (90)
Next, from Corollary 3, βPub > (<)βPri if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0. Thus, the social welfare is larger
(smaller) under public contract if and only if
[
∂Ci
∂ si
]
o
< 0.
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